Unveiling the Hidden Dynamics: Informal Judicial Institutions in the German Law Journal

Years of research and a dedicated workshop in Prague in the Autumn of 2022 have culminated in the publication of a Special Issue of the German Law Journal. The Special Issue concludes the first INFINITY work package. It advances research on the often overlooked role of informality in courts and judicial administration through 19 articles on over 360 pages – including the introduction, 13 case studies and five topical articles.

8 Mar 2024 Etienne Hanelt

Years of research and a dedicated workshop in Prague in the Autumn of 2022 have culminated in the publication of a Special Issue of the German Law Journal. The Special Issue concludes the first INFINITY work package. It advances research on the often overlooked role of informality in courts and judicial administration through 19 articles on over 360 pages – including the introduction, 13 case studies and five topical articles.

The introduction by Kosař, Šipulová & Urbániková explains the rationale of the project: while courts don’t come immediately to mind when one thinks of ‘informality’, there is often more than meets the eye. Informal institutions often account for the difference between the performance of courts on paper and in reality. In fact, informal institutions, practices and acts, while ubiquitous, are not always easy to spot. Judiciaries can be affected by informal institutions that involve many actors, sometimes without judicial participation (external informal institutions). In more cases, informal institutions work between judges (internal) or judges and third parties (mixed).

The first part details how informal institutions are created and how they affect the courts. Leloup explains that in Belgium, informality is corrected and quickly formalised wherever it appears. In the Czech Republic, informal institutions have helped to create ‘superjudges’, individuals in robes – not capes – who have amassed much power (Kadlec & Blisa). ‘Talks, Dinners, and Envelopes at Nightfall’ sounds like the title of a thriller but adroitly describes problematic informal practices at the German Federal Constitutional Court (Steininger). In Ireland, we learn from O’Brien how soft standards of supranational and international organisations have driven the transition from informal systems of judicial governance in the areas of judicial conduct and appointments. Ireland has decidedly moved towards the continent in this regard. In Spain, as Iglesias & Bustos Gisbert explain, nearly every candidate wishing to have a career in the judiciary hires a coach – usually a sitting judge – to prepare for the challenging entrance examination. The problem is that they are nearly always paid in black money, creating a system where prospective judges and prosecutors witness corruption at the first point of contact with the legal system. If any judicial system can be equated with informality, it is Britain’s. Yet neither the channel nor Brexit could stop the pressure to formalise the informal in past decades. Nevertheless, the system has kept a distinctively British flavour rooted in centuries of conventions (Turenne).

The case studies in the second part study the links between informality in judicial systems and the strength and erosion of democracy. Benvenuti studies how in Italy, informal institutions have contributed to factional politics at the country’s judicial council. In Romania’s rule of law crisis, some judicial associations have mobilised their members, and informal communications have driven the strategic use of preliminary references to the European Court of Justice (Doroga & Bercea). Šipulová & Spáč explain how, in Slovakia, reforms have insulated the judiciary from political branches but maintained a hierarchical and corrupt judicial system. The article shows how reforms fell short because judges did not internalise norms such as judicial independence. In Hungary, formal institutions are means to ends that informal institutions reveal: a combination of ‘gatekeeping’, ‘channelling’, ‘carrots and sticks’ and ‘emergency breaks’ ensure the outcomes Orbán’s regime wishes for (Vincze). Quite the opposite in Israel, where Lurie finds ‘invisible safeguards’ that help protect judicial independence, with their effective functioning on full display in the recent rule of law crisis. In Georgia, ‘judicial oligarchs’ captured the judicial council and controlled the courts through a pyramid scheme (Tsereteli). Finally, in Ukraine, a reinvigorated civil society has emerged after Euromaidan and has become an informal actor in the attempts to reform the formerly corrupt judiciary (Lashyn, Leshchyshyn & Popova).

The third and last part of the Special Issue goes beyond individual cases, painting pictures with a broader brush. Kosař & Vincze compare informal institutions with what is conventionally called ‘constitutional conventions’: we learn why constitutional conventions ought to be thought of as a subtype of the former. Hamřík discusses some of the key actors of informal institutions and practices: collective bodies such as judicial councils, but also individuals like court presidents, chief justices, and law clerks. Leloup considers ‘supranational actors as drivers of formalization’. Why have such bodies recommended formalisation, and how should this be evaluated? While many case studies detail the negative impacts of informality, Smekal appraises the positive. What does it mean for informal institutions to have a positive impact, how do we know, and under what circumstances is it true? Finally, Šipulová and Kosař discuss the takeaways from the relationship between informal institutions and endogenous decay and exogenous erosion of democracy. While formalisation is often thought to shield against backsliding, it does not suffice if a gap between regulation and practice within the judiciary persists.

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