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The Personalization of Politics in the Council of the
European Union and the European Council

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Abstract

The Treaty of Lisbon brought about several institutional innovations that, at first sight, put greater emphasis on individual European Union (EU) politicians rather than EU institutions as such. This paper explores the phenomenon of political personalization within the Council of the European Union and the European Council, examining how the roles and powers of individual political actors have evolved within these institutions. Thus, the question this study aims to answer is whether politics at the two institutions' institutional level has become more personalized. The article employs the concept of personalization of politics and provides a qualitative content analysis of the formal rules governing institutions' internal functioning. It concludes that (a) there has been institutional (de-)personalization of politics within both institutions; (b) the personalization is evident in the mandate-related responsibilities and agenda-shaping powers of particular actors; but (c) collective actors and the EU Member States' representatives have not lost the key powers.

Keywords

Personalization of politics, European Council, European Council President, Council of the European Union, Council Presidency, Institutional personalization of politics, Centralized and decentralized personalization of politics, Depersonalization of politics

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The Personalization of Politics in the Council of the European Union and the European Council

Lukáš Hamřík*

1 Introduction

Following the meeting of the European Council (EUCO) in Laeken in 2001, and in accordance with the Laeken Declaration, the Convention on the Future of Europe was set up (EUCO 2001, 20). Initially, the EUCO expected that a work of the Convention would result in a document containing various options or recommendations for institutional reforms in the European Union (EU), hence providing a starting point for debates during a subsequent Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) (EUCO 2001). Instead, under the chairmanship of Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, the Convention led to the Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (see e.g. Closa 2004). Of course, it is not to blame the Convention President for the outcome of the reform process and the subsequent rejections of the Constitution in ratification phase. Rather, this example illustrates the fact that within the EU, a single individual politician can make a significant difference and shape EU politics.

Despite the rejections of the Constitution in various referendums, many of its provisions entered into force with the Treaty of Lisbon. As far as the Council of the European Union (CEU) and the EUCO are concerned, at least two institutional changes come immediately to mind. The first one is the institutionalization of the permanent position of the EUCO President, leading to a separation of the President from the rotating Presidency of the Council. The second reform relates to the CEU, with more responsibilities being assigned to the person holding the position of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR).¹ The HR presides over the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) and – at the same time – she is one of the Vice-Presidents of the European Commission (EC).

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¹ I also refer to the High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy (HR CFSP) for the pre-Lisbon period.

Instead of focusing on particular instances of institutional reforms that, at first sight, put greater emphasis on individual EU politicians, this paper deals with a broader phenomenon known as the personalization of politics – i.e. the growing role and importance of individual politicians at the expense of a given collective actor – in the CEU and the EUCO. More specifically, the analysis presented here seeks to (a) evaluate whether there has been a degree of institutional personalization of politics in the CEU and the EUCO; (b) identify the spheres of politics within the two institutions in which political personalization² can be observed; and (c) assess who are the actors (if any) who have gained the most from the personalization of politics.

Based on qualitative content analysis (CA) of the Union’s primary law as well as formal rules governing the functioning of the CEU and the EUCO, this study reveals that: (a) a few individual politicians’ positions have been enhanced within the institutions, although the prerogatives of collective actors and the importance of Member States’ representatives have not been challenged; (b) institutional personalization can be observed primarily in rules governing the conduct of meetings, and to some extent, also in agenda management in the CEU and the EUCO; (c) out of all the individual actors under study, the importance of the EUCO President, the holder of the rotating Presidency, and the HR have been especially strengthened. Hence, centralized personalization clearly dominates over its decentralized counterpart.

In what follows, I begin by introducing the concept of political personalization. Then, I look at the current state of the art concerning relevant actors within the two institutions. In Part Three, I specify the actors of personalization, the methods, and the data. Section Four contains the analysis of institutional personalization, while the last part provides conclusions and directions for future research.

2 The personalization of politics

The concept of political personalization has become a popular approach when studying political systems at both national and supranational levels of governance. The reason for this growing interest lies especially in the changing patterns of democratic politics in last century, and, more specifically, in the

² Both terms, ‘the personalization of politics’ and ‘political personalization’, are used interchangeably in this study.

decreasing importance of collective actors.³ As a consequence of changing importance of collective entities, scholars have often argued that ‘individual political actors are becoming more prominent at the expense of parties and collective identities’ (Karvonen 2010, 4). Thus, the personalization of politics can be understood as (a) a process that (b) involves two groups of actors (individual politicians and collective actors) which have their own positions and importance within the political system, and that (c) generally speaking, these distributions of power (between individuals and collective actors) are not unalterable. Such a conceptualization can be perceived as a narrower one since it assumes that there are clear ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ of the process (i.e. the power, importance or visibility flows from collective to individual actors). In this study, I adopt a broader conceptualization of personalization focusing primarily on changing roles of individuals (see e.g. Cross, Katz, and Pruyers 2018; Hamřík and Kaniok 2022). In this understanding, personalization could take place also in situations in which the positions of collective actors and their powers are not directly affected, for example, when the individuals are given new responsibilities or powers.

Conceptual ambiguity is not the only characteristic of the concept of personalization. As it is obvious from both broad and narrow understandings, the concept as such does not specify (a) to which sphere of politics it refers to; and (b) who the actors of the process are, behind a dichotomy of individual politicians and collective entities (see e.g. Renwick and Pilet 2016). As regards the first question, personalization can be investigated in all spheres of politics, such as candidates’ and citizens’ behaviour, in the media, or at the institutional level (Rahat and Sheafer, 2007). This study focuses on the institutional personalization of politics, which is defined as ‘the adoption of rules, mechanisms, and institutions that put more emphasis on the individual politician and less on political groups, and parties’ (Rahat and Sheafer 2007, 67–68).

The second question concerns the actors of personalization. Obviously, actors of personalization are individual politicians. However, it is important to distinguish whether the power flows from a collective actor to individual ‘top politicians’ or to politicians who are not positioned on the top of institution or

³ For the roots of personalized politics in the 20th Century, see e.g. Wattenberg (1991), Blondel and Thiélbault (2010), McAllister (2007), Blais (2011), or Rahat and Kenig (2018).

level of governance in question. Bearing this in mind, we may be interested in centralized and/or decentralized personalization, taking the two possible – and not mutually exclusive – directions of personalization into account. Centralized personalization refers to a process during which ‘power flows upwards from the group (e.g. political party, cabinet) to a single leader (e.g. party leader, prime minister, president)’. In case of a scenario going in the opposite direction (i.e. decentralized personalization), ‘power flows downwards from the group to individual politicians who are not party or executive leaders (e.g. candidates, members of parliament, ministers)’ (Balmas et al. 2014, 37).

In this study, I focus on the adoption of formal rules, mechanisms and institutions affecting the functioning of the EUCO and the CEU. In doing so, attention is paid to actors affected by either centralized or decentralized personalization (see Figure 1 below). Moreover, I also take into consideration the eventual trend of the depersonalization of politics, i.e. the growing importance and powers of collective actors influencing the position of individual politicians.

3 Literature review

The personalization of politics is becoming a more popular phenomenon for investigation in the context of EU politics. Recently, several studies have been published that have focused on all three spheres of politics, however, mostly on media personalization (e.g. Gattermann 2018, 2020, 2022; Schulze 2016) and behavioural personalization (e.g. Hobolt 2014; Gatterman 2022; Gatterman and Marquart 2020; Gattermann and de Vreese 2017). The institutional sphere can be considered the least researched area of personalization at the EU level, with the exception of studies focused on the European Commission (Hamřík 2021) and the European Parliament (Hamřík and Kaniok 2022). To this date, a study on the institutional personalization of politics in the EUCO and CEU is missing. Despite that, extensive research on the two institutions provide useful insights into their internal functioning and processes, as well as the actors operating within them. In this regard, scholarship on (a) changes in the rules under which the EUCO, the CEU, and the various levels within these operate, (b) the role of individual actors in influencing the functioning of both institutions, and (c) political leadership highlighting the role of the EUCO President and the Council Presidency are especially relevant.

One of the most important actors in the internal functioning of the CEU is the rotating Council Presidency.⁴ Its responsibilities include the organization of work at particular levels of the CEU, agenda management, and monitoring progress in discussions. The Presidency often acts as a mediator in negotiations, and it also has a representative function (Tallberg 2006; Metcalfe 1998; Fernández 2008; Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 1995). The Presidency is considered the main actor in Council agenda management (Tallberg 2006, 48). It has several procedural instruments to shape the agenda, including presenting a political programme for the Presidency,⁵ developing specific proposals for action, or deciding on day-to-day meeting agendas, as well as setting the meeting schedule to be followed during a Presidential term (Tallberg 2006, 84–86). To put it in more general terms, the Presidency has three options how to shape the agenda, i.e. agenda-setting, agenda-structuring, and agenda-excluding (Tallberg 2003).⁶

The importance of the Presidency can also be seen in decision-making stages once the agenda has been set. The Presidency is the crucial actor in negotiations at the various levels of the Council. Since it has (a) access to information which is unknown to other actors of negotiation, (b) control over the negotiating process via procedural instruments, and (c) other actors' assumptions of its neutrality and effectiveness, the Presidency is best placed to reach an agreement and limit the possibility of negotiation failure (Tallberg 2004, 2008). Notwithstanding the mediation function of the Presidency, studies have indicated that the Presidency is also able to shape the outcomes of decision-making progress to its benefit (Thomson 2008; Tallberg 2008), especially during later stages of the policy-making process (Schalk et al. 2007).

Speaking about decision-making within the CEU, the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) is also a vital player. Apart from COREPER's 'classic

4 One could legitimately argue, and it would be supported by previous studies, that the General Secretariat also plays an important role within the CEU. Nevertheless, since I do not follow the General Secretariat (see Figure 1 below and the explanation in the methodological section), it has also been excluded from this section of the paper. For more information on the Secretariat's role, see e.g. Lewis (2003), or Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace (1995).

5 Since September 2006, the political programme for 18 months has been presented by the 'team presidency' composed of three Member States (CEU 2006).

6 It is worth emphasizing that these powers are not precisely defined in CEU internal rules. Rather, they should be perceived as the product of partially defined formal rules and informal practices (Tallberg 2003).

role' of assisting in and preparing Council meetings, its importance also lies in the fact that a significant amount of legislation is pre-adopted at this (or a lower) level (Bostock 2002; Häge 2007; Lewis 2003). From this point of view, the COREPER can be perceived as a *de facto* decision-making body where agreements are made, and compromises are reached (Lempp and Altenschmidt 2008; Lewis 1998, 481; Lewis 2000, 265).

Due to the EU enlargement process, the functioning of the COREPER has changed significantly as several procedural innovations preventing a deadlock were introduced. These institutional innovations have changed the appearance of COREPER's meetings. Various examples of these institutional changes include the establishment of the lead speaker presenting a common position of the group of representatives, the setting of limits on speaking time, a limit on the number of delegations' representatives, and the rare use of table rounds (Lempp 2007; Lempp and Altenschmidt 2008). As a consequence, these changes influenced the role of the Chair at the COREPER level. The COREPER Chair plays a crucial role not only in leading the meetings and organizing the work of the Committee, but also in ensuring the efficiency of COREPER's work. A COREPER Chair has a variety of powers at his disposal, allowing him to shape the agenda, to steer the decision-making at the COREPER level, and to influence decision-making at the EU level⁷ (Noël 1967; Lempp and Altenschmidt 2008; Lewis 2000). As Lempp and Altenschmidt (2008, 521–522) have emphasized, the leadership at – not exclusively – the COREPER level has become more necessary and at the same time more difficult.

With the entry of the Lisbon Treaty into force, the institute of the Council Presidency changed significantly. Two aspects should be highlighted in this regard. First, the rotating Council Presidency was decoupled from the EUCO, which is now chaired by a permanent President. For many decades as an informal EU institution (i.e. with no formal legal basis), the EUCO was chaired by the representative of the Member State holding the Council Presidency (see, e.g. Dinan 2013). Nevertheless, it should be stressed that the link between the rotating Presidency and the permanent EUCO President has remained very tight. The rotating Presidency was granted the position of the permanent President's deputy, and both actors are mutually responsible for

⁷ For the COREPER's role in co-decision procedure, see e.g. Häge (2007) and Bostock (2002).

preparing EUCO meetings in close cooperation (Batory and Puetter 2013, 97-98; Blavoukos, Bourantonis, and Pagoulatos 2007).

With the establishment of the permanent position of EUCO President, some of the responsibilities were shifted from the rotating Presidency to the EUCO President. However, not all of them have become exclusive competences of the President (Dinan 2013, 2017; Blavoukos, Bourantonis, and Pagoulatos 2007). The President is indeed responsible for the overall coordination of work of the EUCO, and she also can – to some extent – influence the agenda by prioritizing some policies and omitting some items from the agenda. Moreover, the President (with his longer, two-and-a-half-year term compared to the six-month term of the rotating Presidency) can be perceived as a person who represents the Union and guarantees continuity of external representation (together with the HR) (Crum 2009; Tömmel 2017; Dinan 2013, 2017; de Waele and Broeksteeg 2012; Blavoukos, Bourantonis, and Pagoulatos 2007). Nevertheless, from an overall point of view, the position of a permanent EUCO President has been seen as an institutionally weak office (Dinan 2017, 158). Second, the FAC's Presidency is no longer the responsibility of the Member State holding the rotating Council Presidency, as the person holding the office of HR is at the same time the FAC Chair.

This impressive body of scholarship shows us that the personalization of politics could be a relevant phenomenon for EUCO/CEU politics. As demonstrated, it is possible to observe many institutional changes that eventually affected the position of individual actors within the EUCO and CEU. This article aims to systematically evaluate the process of institutional change within the two institutions with an emphasis on changing role and importance of individual politicians.

4 Research design: Actors, areas of EUCO and CEU activities under study, data and methods

One reason for focusing on both institutions can be seen in their internal (and closely connected) institutional development. Despite the fact that the EUCO only officially became one of the EU institutions after the Treaty of Lisbon, the two institutions used to be close to each other via e.g. the rotating Council Presidency. Hence, I consider it necessary to follow the two institutions at the same time in order to avoid false claims about institutional personalization.

Since the concept of personalization refers to politicians, I will focus on the most political level(s). In the case of the EUCO (as a collective actor), the actors of centralized personalization include the EUCO President, or the Council Presidency prior to the Lisbon Treaty, while the Heads of States and Governments represent actors of decentralized personalization. It should be stressed here that the conceptualization of Member State representatives in the EUCO (and also at the ministerial level of the Council configurations) as actors of decentralized personalization does not mean that they are less important within intra-institutional politics or within EU politics. Rather, that assignment follows the logic of institutional personalization as presented above, without questioning the dominant position of Member State representatives.

Within the CEU, I follow two levels, i.e. the ministerial level of the Council (the Council or a particular Council configuration as a collective actor) and the level of the COREPER (as a collective actor). In the first case, a Council Presidency is conceptualized as an actor of centralized personalization⁸ while the rest of the members of Council (in any of its configurations, i.e. individual ministers) serve as actors of decentralized personalization. At the COREPER level, the COREPER Chair(s) serve(s) as an actor of centralized personalization while the other Committee members were followed to examine decentralized personalization. Both groups of actors with respect to the direction of personalization are summarized in Figure 1. At this point, it should be mentioned that special attention will be paid to institutional development within the FAC (formerly part of the General Affairs and External Relations [GAER] Council), bearing in mind changes in position and responsibilities of the HR.

⁸ One could argue that the Council Presidency is a collective actor which is composed of country representatives. That is indeed correct. However, when looking at the intra-institutional functioning of the CEU (and of the pre-Lisbon EUCO), a particular Council configuration is chaired by an individual minister responsible for a portfolio in question, e.g. the Minister of Justice of the state holding the Council Presidency presides over the Justice and Home Affairs Council.




Figure 1. Actors of institutional personalization of politics in the Council of the European Union and European Council.

In investigating institutional personalization, I have narrowed down the focus to four analytical categories in which political personalization is followed. The operationalization of these categories is provided in Table 1. I analysed formal rules governing the functioning of the EUCO and CEU in four categories as stipulated in the EU primary law and the institutions' Rules of Procedure (RoP). In this regard, it should be emphasized that the EUCO has only had its own official and written RoP since 2009. Before that, its operating rules had a rather informal character (see, e.g. Lewis 2010). For that reason, I supplemented the dataset by also including EUCO Presidency Conclusions. The analysis covers the period between 1993 (the entry of the Maastricht Treaty into force) and 2018. In this regard, the Treaty on the EU serves as a point of reference, as well as the Rules of Procedure of the Council of 1993.⁹

⁹ Council Decision of 6 December 1993 (93/662/EC).

Category	Subcategories	Operationalization
Mandate	Nomination/ election/ appointment/ dismissal procedures	<p><i>Intra-institutional procedures:</i> actors' competences related to the nomination, election, and appointment of the EUCO President, Secretary-General/(HR CFSP), HR, Deputy Secretary-General; CFSP Special Representatives</p> <p><i>Inter-institutional procedures:</i> actors' involvement in and competences regarding interinstitutional election procedures, i.e. EC, Executive Board of the European Central Bank (Board President, Vice President, members); Judges and Advocates General of the CJEU and members of the Court of First Instance/General Court and Court of Auditors; members of the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of Regions</p>
	Performance of mandate	Convening of the meetings of the EUCO, the CEU, the COREPER; preparing and coordinating meetings; conducting sittings and discussions; organizing meetings of the working parties and various committees and ensuring availability of their reports for COREPER meetings; deputizing; arranging the order of speakers; allocating speaking time; presenting positions for a group of participants (a single spokesperson); moderating table rounds; keeping minutes of meetings; representing the Council/EUCO; deciding on overall responsibilities and competences of actors
Internal organization	—	Deciding on Council configurations, COREPER, setting up committees and working parties
Agenda shaping	Agenda setting	Drafting provisional agenda(s) for particular meetings and meetings to be conducted during the Presidential term; including of agenda items; adopting final agendas; shaping policy debates on the Presidency's or the Commission's programmes, raising points of discussion during the meetings; drafting the operational programme of Council activities; proposing multiannual strategic programmes for the EUCO
	Agenda structuring	Allocating speaking time on a particular agenda item, arranging the order of agenda items in discussions; setting deadlines for proposals and for expressing positions
	Agenda exclusion	Proposing items to be omitted from the agenda; withdrawing 'A' points
Internal decision-making	—	Quorum; opening a voting procedure; delegating voting rights; offering explanations of votes; Written Procedure and Simplified Written Procedure

Table 1. The analytical framework.

When it comes to the methodological setup of the study, it should be stressed that individual sub-areas of political personalization field differ in terms of the appropriateness of particular methods. While it is quite common and straightforward to employ quantitative methods in researching media and behavioural personalization, it is quite challenging to investigate institutional personalization quantitatively. Here, the authors prefer qualitative techniques and offer qualitative interpretations of the phenomenon¹¹ (see, e.g. Rahat and Sheafer 2007; Balmas et al. 2014; several studies in Cross, Katz, and Pruyers 2018; and Poguntke and Webb 2005). In this study, I analyse formal rules using qualitative CA. This type of CA provides an opportunity to gain a more detailed insight into how the personalization took place. Nevertheless, in order to (a) compare personalization within individual analytical categories and between individual actors; (b) provide a longitudinal analysis of personalization; and (c) evaluate the scope of personalization, I report also the quantitative overview of (de-)personalizing reforms. Apparently, such an approach could be questioned in terms of setting up criteria for evaluating institutional reforms (quantitative assessment), or because of the risk of supporting previous findings and of over-subjectivity (qualitative CA) (Hsieh and Shannon 2005, 1283). In order to increase the validity of the findings, the Appendix contains an overview of identified (de-)personalizing reforms, and their assignment to the individual categories under study.

The analysis can be best understood as a four-step process (for a detailed explanation, see the Appendix). Firstly, the RoP articles and/or Treaty provisions¹² containing information about competences of actors under study were identified. Secondly, these relevant text passages were assigned to various analytical categories (see Table 1 above). Thirdly, I was interested in whether there were any changes in the relevant provisions from one version (t_0) to another (t_1). Finally, I evaluated whether the identified changes affected the balance of power between individual and collective actors (personalization vs. depersonalization). If a personalizing reform was identified, I further distinguished between centralized and decentralized personalization.

11 One clear exception is research on personalization of electoral systems.

12 When analysing primary law, I limited my account to institutional provisions (with the exception of the role of HR).

5 Analysis

Is it possible to observe the institutional personalization of politics in the EUCO and the CEU? In which spheres can personalization be observed? If there is institutional personalization, which actors profit the most from that institutional development? In answering these questions, the analysis proceeds in three steps. I begin with a quantitative assessment of institutional personalization. Then, in order to clearly illustrate the personalization, I look deeper into formal rules. In this regard, I provide the selected most visible instances of institutional personalization. Lastly, I evaluate the consequences of personalization on the position of the actors under study within the two institutions.

5.1 A quantitative assessment of institutional personalization in the CEU and the EUCO

Based on the qualitative CA of formal rules governing the functioning of the EUCO and the CEU, I identified 89 reforms that affected the position and competences of individual politicians in the period under study. As Figure 2 illustrates, out of 89 reforms, 69 reforms (77.5%) were favourable to individual actors, and thus, they can be considered personalizing reforms. On the other hand, 20 reforms (22.5%) in some way limited the importance and/or powers of individuals. Hence, it can be said that personalization clearly exceeded depersonalization. Nevertheless, when looking at the results presented in Figure 2, another conclusion can be drawn. Speaking about personalizing reforms, out of the total number of 69, 61 reforms (88%) enhanced the position of actors benefiting from centralized personalization (See also Figure 1 above). In other words, centralized institutional personalization overwhelmingly dominated over decentralized personalization.




Figure 2. Institutional personalization (centralized and decentralized) vs. institutional depersonalization in the CEU and the EUCO.

Since I followed more than one actor benefiting from centralized personalization, one additional observation is worth mentioning. Looking at centralized reforms, the analysis revealed that these were quite equally distributed among EUCO President (19 reforms), the rotating Presidency of the CEU (24), and the High Representative (23). The higher total number of centralized reforms (66 compared to 61 reported above) is a result of the assignment of five reforms as favourable to the EUCO President and the rotating Presidency at the same time.¹³

Figure 3 shows us how the reforms (both personalizing and depersonalizing) are distributed in the followed period.¹⁴ In this regard, three explanations should be made. First, a comparatively higher number of depersonalized reforms is obvious in Treaty of Nice (7 reforms out of 20 total) and the Council's RoP of 2004 (5 reforms out of 20). One reason for the higher number of depersonalized reforms in the former case is the fact that the majority of reforms were related to nomination and election procedures, more

¹³ For more details, including the distribution of centralized personalizing reforms within individual categories, see Table 3 of the Appendix.

¹⁴ Figure 3 only contains analysed documents in which at least one relevant reform was identified. Nevertheless, all versions of RoP and primary law since 1993 were analysed.

specifically, to the transition from unanimity to qualified majority voting (QMV). Such reforms were classified as ‘depersonalized’ because they reduced the influence of individual Member State representatives in election procedures. In the latter case (the CEU’s RoP of 2004), depersonalization can be seen as a consequence of the enlargement process and the need to adapt the CEU’s functioning to an enlarged EU. Second, the higher number of centralized reforms relates primarily to changes in the position of High Representative, and partially to the position of EUCO President as well. Third, the high level of centralized personalization in the EUCO’s RoP of 2009 can be explained, obviously, by the fact that the EUCO became an official EU institution, and thus, formally adopted its RoP.¹⁵ Especially the last point should lead us to think about personalization in the EUCO with caution, as it is not possible to exclude the possibility that some of the identified personalizing reforms could have already been a part of the EUCO’s internal – but not yet formalized – practices.

¹⁵ With respect to Figure 3, it must be stressed that the overall number of personalizing reforms is higher when compared to Figure 2 (67 compared to 61 for centralized personalization and 9 compared to 8 for decentralized personalization) due to their appearance in primary law as well as in the subsequent version of institutions’ internal RoP. For the sake of comprehensiveness, I present their appearance in formal rules in Figure 3; however, for the purpose of analysis as presented by Figure 2, such reforms were counted as one. For the seven reforms that appeared in both sources, see Table 4 of the Appendix.




Figure 3. Centralized and decentralized personalization vs. depersonalization in the period of 1993–2018.

The last part of the quantitative assessment deals with individual categories of EUCO and CEU activities (see Table 1 above). It is evident that the most personalized and – at the same time – depersonalized category is the ‘Mandate’ category. As already stated above, depersonalization should be explained in the context of changes in nomination, election, and appointment procedures. The majority (12 out of 20) of the depersonalizing reforms that were identified fell into this subcategory. On the other hand, the institutional personalization within the second subcategory (focusing on issues related to the performance of a mandate) demonstrates the growing importance of the HR, the introduction of a permanent EUCO President, and, to some extent, the growing importance of the rotating CEU Presidency. The strengthened position of the rotating Presidency is more visible in ‘Agenda management’ within the Council. Within this category, a majority of the centralized personalizing reforms related to the agenda-setting and agenda-structuring powers of the rotating Presidency. Looking at the remaining two categories, there were only few personalizing reforms that changed internal decision-making procedures (in terms of personalization), and no reforms affecting the balance of power between individual and collective actors when it came to internal organization.




Figure 4. Institutional (de)personalization of politics in the individual spheres of the activities under review.

5.2 A look beyond the numbers: Selected instances of institutional personalization in the CEU and the EUCO

The previous section suggested that there has been institutional personalization of politics in the CEU and the EUCO. However, to assess whether there has been significant enhancement in the positions of individual politicians, more detailed analysis of formal rules is necessary.

5.2.1 Mandate

The quantitative analysis has shown that this category was both the most personalized and the most depersonalized. Looking at the aspects I followed, one general observation can be made. Institutional personalization is most visible in rules governing the conducting of meetings ('sittings') and in the roles of the EUCO President, the rotating Presidency, and the position of HR. On the other hand, depersonalizing reforms are mostly observable in nomination, election, and appointment procedures.

To begin with the mandate and meetings-related issues, the President convenes the Council on his own initiative, or when requested to do so by one

of the CEU members or a member of the EC (OJEC 1992, 147; OJEU 2008, 237; CEU 1993, 1[1]; 2009, 1[1]). Obviously, the EUCO President convenes the EUCO meetings, and, if needed, she may convene special meetings. In this regard, the President's right to do so became unlimited in a way that a special meeting must not necessarily deal with the CFSP (EUCO 2009, 1[1]; see also OJEC 1992, J.8[4]; OJEU 2008, 15[3], 23[1]). Similarly to a procedure used in the CEU before the Lisbon Treaty, in the case of EUCO, the President – in cooperation with the CEU member who will hold the CEU Presidency – also announces dates when EUCO meetings will take place (EUCO 2009, Art 1[1]; CEU 2006 1[2]).

From the personalization point of view, the role of the Presidency (both within the EUCO and the CEU) has definitely grown in importance with respect to the conducting of meetings. The CEU Presidency gained quite extensive formal powers in 2000. From this point on, it is the Presidency that has the responsibility for debates being conducted in an appropriate way, and for following the RoP. In doing so, the Presidency can, for example, decide on (a) restrictions on the number of persons present in a meeting room; (b) limitations on speaking time; (c) limitations on the number of representatives allowed to present their position (i.e. similar positions should be presented by one person); and (d) the exceptional use of full table rounds (CEU 2000, 20[1a]; 2002, 20[1c][1e]; 2004, Annex IV[10]; 2009, 20[1a][1c][1e]). In fulfilling its tasks, the Presidency is assisted by other members of the pre-set trio of Member States. It is worth mentioning that the role of those other members has evolved from taking care of certain administrative tasks (CEU 2000, 20[2]) to full involvement in all Presidency's responsibilities (CEU 2009, 1[4], 20[2]).

Looking at the EUCO, its President is the actor primary responsible for the preparation of EUCO meetings, in cooperation with the GAC and the EC (EUCO, 2009, 2[2]; CEU, 2009, 2[2]). In this regard, his importance has increased compared to that of the rotating Presidency in organizing EUCO meetings before the 2009 revision. The Presidency's pre-Lisbon role was limited to the practical organization of EUCO's proceedings (together with the General Secretariat). At that time, the main actor in the overall preparation was the GAC/GAER Council. However, the President obtained more extensive powers in preparing the meetings, and ultimately became an actor as important as the GAC (CEU 2000, 2[2]; 2004, 2[2a][3b]; 2006, 2[2a][3]; 2009, 2[2]; EUCO 2009, 2[2]). In a similar vein, the President became the actor responsible for the work

of the EUCO, and thus replaced the former GAER Council. Nevertheless, the GAC still provides a framework for the EUCO President, as she has to take into account the work of the GAC (EUCO 2009, 2[1]; CEU 2006, 2[2a]). Close cooperation between the EUCO and the CEU can also be seen at a level of individual politicians, manifested in the growing importance of individual actors. In this regard, I can mention the institutionalization of regular meetings of the EUCO President and the rotating Presidency (and the EC) (EUCO 2009, 2[3]); or cooperation between the President and the CEU Presidency when reporting to the EUCO on the work of the CEU (EUCO 2009, 4[1]).

To conclude regarding mandate-related issues, personalization is visible also in the position of HR. Through treaties and RoP revisions, the HR has taken on responsibility for (a) conducting political dialogue with third parties (OJEC 1992, J.16; 1997, 26); (b) informing the EP and the CEU on the implementation of enhanced cooperation (OJEC 2002, 27d); (c) ensuring the unity, effectiveness, and consistency of EU's actions (together with the CEU) (OJEC 2002, 13[3]; OJEU 2008, 26[2]); and (d) conducting the CFSP (instead of only assisting the CEU) (OJEC 2002, 26; OJEU 2008, 18[2]). In addition, the HR has a longer term of office compared to the former rotating FAC Presidency (OJEU 2008, 17), she serves as a longer-term President of the FAC (OJEU 2008, 18[3]; CEU 2009, 1[4]), and she is involved into work of the EUCO (OJEU 2008, 15[2]; EUCO 2009, 4[4]).

As far as nomination, election, and appointment procedures are concerned, two developments are worth mentioning. First, separating the EUCO President from the rotating Presidency allowed the EUCO President to have a longer term of office, which is, in addition, renewable (OJEU 2008, 15[5]). However, the establishment of the office of permanent President also gave greater control to the EUCO over the Presidency, as the EUCO can, under some circumstances, end the President's term (OJEU 2008, 15[5]).

Second, a considerable number of depersonalizing reforms were related to the institutionalization of QMV in the nomination and election procedures. However, the involvement of CEU/EUCO members in processes leading to the formation of the Commission deserves more elaboration. In this regard, depersonalization occurred several times. The CEU/EUCO members have become limited (a) by the obligation to let the EP approve any nominee for the EC Presidency (OJEC 1992, 158[2]; 1997, 214[2]); (b) by the need to agree with the nominee for the Presidency on other presumptive Commissioners (instead

of simply consulting with the nominee) (OJEC 1992, 158[2]; 1997, 214[2]); and (c) by the introduction of QMV for the nomination, election, and appointment of the EC and its President (OJEC 2002, 214[2]). The Lisbon treaty has led to further depersonalization since the nominee obtained the possibility to influence the FAC Presidency, because the EC President has to agree on the appointment of the HR (OJEU 2008, 18[1]; OJEC 2002, 207[2]). Bearing all this in mind, it must be stressed that the increasing role the nominee for the EC Presidency plays could also be seen as a sign of institutional personalization. That is indeed true. However, the nominee is not necessary a Council member. From the CEU/EUCO members' point of view, their role has been weakened in the course of the rules' revisions.

5.2.2 Agenda management

As far as agenda-related issues are concerned, the individual CEU members have continued to retain all key competences. They can propose agenda inclusion, even when a draft agenda has already been prepared (however, in that case, it requires a unanimous agreement of other members). Next, the Presidency draws up a draft agenda that is adopted by the Council at the beginning of a particular meeting (CEU 1993, 2[1][2][5]; 2009, 3[1][2][7]). Nevertheless, like to the previous category, it is also possible here to find personalizing reforms that are favourable (especially) to the rotating Presidency, the EUCO President, and the HR.

The rotating Presidency has gained several powers to shape and influence the agenda. Besides serving in the 'classical' role of agenda-setter through the Presidency's programme prepared with other members of the pre-set trio, the Presidency is able to, for example, (a) set the order of and the time for discussions on a particular agenda item (CEU 2000, 20[1b]); set deadlines for proposing amendments on agenda items (CEU 2002, 20[1d]); recommend opening particular policy debates to the public, thereby identifying which legislative proposals it feels are important and thus should be open to public deliberation (CEU 2002, 8[1a]; 2006, 8[2]).

The EUCO President submits an annotated draft agenda for the EUCO meetings to the GAC. In the pre-Lisbon period, it was the GAER Council that would prepare the agenda, following a proposal by the rotating Presidency. Nowadays, both the EUCO President and the rotating Presidency are more directly involved in the agenda-drafting phase (EUCO 2009, 3[1]; CEU 2006

2[3a]). The EUCO President draws up the draft agenda based on GAC discussions prior to the EUCO meeting. In this regard, the President has replaced the GAER Council, which used to approve the agenda for the EUCO (CEU 2006, 2[3b]; EUCO 2009, 2[6]). It is indeed true that the EUCO approves the agenda at the beginning of its meeting, but the EUCO President has more opportunities to shape the agenda between the end of the GAC meeting and the beginning of the EUCO meeting. The EUCO President is also responsible for preparing guidelines for EUCO conclusions, and she can also draft conclusions and decisions adopted during EUCO meetings (EUCO 2009, 3[1]). Lastly, the EUCO President is involved in preparing the Presidencies' 18-month programme of Council activities (CEU 2009, 2[6]).

The HR, similarly to the EUCO President, also participates in the process leading to the creation of the Presidencies' 18-month programme, as far as issues related to the agenda falling under the scope of FAC (CEU 2009, 2[6]). Besides that, she has also become an important agenda-setter within his spheres of activities, as she is expected to formulate, prepare, and implement policy decisions related to CFSP (OJEC 1992, J.16; OJEC 1997, 26).

Depersonalizing reforms related to agenda management reflect the enlargement process and the need to maintain the efficiency of proceedings within the CEU. For that reason, individual politicians (a) are not allowed to place an item on the agenda just for presentation or information, and (b) should raise any other business items before the COREPER meeting (CEU 2004, Annex IV[4][6][7]; see also procedural changes related to conduct of sittings discussed above).

5.2.3 Internal decision-making procedures

Amendments concerning internal decision-making procedures only had a slight effect in terms of personalization. The CEU Presidency and EUCO President, as usual, initiate voting, and they are obliged to do so if it is demanded by other members or by EC representatives, and with CEU members' agreement (CEU 1993, 7[1]; 1999, 9[1]; 2009, 11[1]; EUCO 2009, 6[2]). However, the office of the permanent EUCO President does not grant its holder the right to cast a vote during EUCO meetings, and his presence is not even taken into account when calculating if there is a quorum (OJEU 2008, 235[1]; EUCO 2009, 6[3][4]).

In this category, however, signs of personalization can be seen in the Written Procedure. Before the 2009 revisions, the Presidency could only propose using the Written Procedure in special circumstances. Usually, it was the CEU or COREPER that were the actors responsible for deciding on using this instrument. Later on, the EUCO President secured the right to propose adopting some urgent decisions by Written Procedure. Nevertheless, the President still needs the agreement of all EUCO members (CEU 2006, 12[1]; EUCO 2009, 7). Some personalizing changes also affected the Simplified Written Procedure. The Presidency secured the power to initiate the use of Simplified Written Procedure for (a) decisions on consulting other institutions or bodies; (b) appointments of members of the European Economic and Social Committee, and of the Committee of the Regions; and (c) adoption of text replying to written or oral questions submitted to the CEU (CEU 1993, 8[4]; 1998, 8[4]; 2006, 12[2]; 2009, 12[2]).

5.2.4 Internal organization

Within the last category, I was not able to identify any sign of institutional personalization. Rules governing the institutions' internal organization remained intact. The EUCO (which replaced the GAER Council) holds the key deciding powers with respect to CEU configurations, and the COREPER sets up (or approves setting up) committees and working parties (CEU 1993, 19[2]; 2000, 2[1]; 2002, 2[1]; 2009, 2[1] and 19[3]).

5.3 Who gained and lost the most?

Institutional personalization of politics indeed occurred in the EUCO and the CEU, and for that reason, there must be 'winners' of that institutional development. Both quantitative and qualitative assessments point to a conclusion that three individual actors have profited from personalization: the rotating Presidency, the EUCO President, and the HR.

The CEU Presidency has been to some extent weakened, in the sense that it lost the opportunity to preside over the FAC and the EUCO. On the other hand, its role has been reinforced in other spheres of CEU functioning. Above all, the Presidency's role related to the proper conduct of Council meetings (at both ministerial and COREPER levels), procedural opportunities to shape the agenda, and its closer cooperation with the EUCO President are evident.

Speaking about the EUCO President, she also gained powers that reinforce his individual importance within the institution. Indeed, some of them could have already been part of the informal practices of the EUCO's internal 'ways of doing things', and thus, the official EUCO RoP may have simply formalized these powers. Nevertheless, there are also some instances of how the President's position has been enhanced compared to the former EUCO Presidency when it was held by the rotating CEU Presidency (e.g. greater involvement in agenda preparation, EUCO meeting organization). Nevertheless, it should be kept in mind that the President is still not entitled to vote, and many of his responsibilities are shared with other collective actors. For that reason, it is not a surprise that she can be perceived as the EUCO's 'top manager' rather than a true EU 'top politician' (see e.g. Dinan 2017).

The HR gained several competences allowing her to shape and conduct the CFSP. However, like the other individual actors, she is not fully independent in fulfilling the tasks falling into the HR's sphere of responsibilities.

Even though the roles of individual politicians (primarily actors of centralized personalization) have been strengthened, they have not significantly affected the importance of collective actors (the EUCO, or the CEU and its various configurations) or the primacy of individual Member States' representatives. It is often said that the Member States are the 'masters of the treaties'. As far as the EUCO and the CEU are concerned, we might also say that they are the 'masters of the processes', despite some personalization of politics. The CEU as a collective actor is co-responsible for, *inter alia*, framing the CFSP (OJEU 2009, 18[2], 26[2]) or for decisions concerning internal decision-making procedures (CEU 2009, 12). The GAC ensures consistency of work within the CEU, and assists the EUCO President with organizing EUCO meetings (CEU 2009, 2[2][3]). It also provides a basis for the work of the EUCO, and it is involved into agenda preparation for the EUCO meetings (EUCO 2009, 2[1], 3). The COREPER remains the collective actor responsible for preparing the work of the CEU, setting up working parties and committees, and it is the main platform for discussions on items that should appear on the agenda of the ministerial level (OJEU 2008, 16[6], 240[1]; CEU 2009, 19[1][2][3]). The EUCO as a whole decides on the CEU's internal organization, and more importantly, defines the EU's political direction, including general guidelines for the CFSP (OJEU 2008, 15[1], 26[1], 27[1], 236). Lastly, the EUCO and the FAC (together

with the HR) also guarantee the consistency of the EU's external action (CEU 2009 2[5]). This brief summary of collective actors' key responsibilities clearly demonstrates the fact that although there are individual politicians benefiting from the institutional personalization, there are no clear losers within the EUCO and the CEU.

6 Conclusion and discussion

This paper looked at the process of institutional change within the CEU and the EUCO through the conceptual lens of political personalization. The analysis provided here suggests that the politics within the two institutions has become more personalized. This personalization is evident, especially when it comes to the conducting of meetings, and to some extent, in agenda-setting and agenda-structuring powers. On the other hand, the depersonalization of politics is obvious in nomination, election, and appointment procedures, as well as in the ways individual politicians have to 'affect' the conduct of meetings as their opportunities, for the sake of effectiveness, became more limited (e.g. Lempp and Altenschmidt 2008).

I was able to identify dozens of institutional reform instances which, in some way or another, enhanced the position of an individual politician within the EUCO and the CEU. In this regard, it was especially the importance of the rotating Council Presidency, the permanent EUCO President, and the HR that has grown in the course of the institutional reform process. More specifically, the rotating Council Presidency (at both ministerial and COREPER levels) not only remained the decisive actor when it comes to the conduct of meetings (Lempp 2007; Lempp and Altenschmidt 2008) and agenda management (Tallberg 2006), but it further strengthened its own position and importance. As regards the permanent EUCO President, it is true that she took over some of the powers previously held by the rotating Council Presidency (Blavoukos, Bourantonis, and Pagoulatos 2007; Dinan 2013, 2017). Nevertheless, this study revealed that even in these cases, the position of the EUCO President has been enhanced, even when omitting newly gained powers. Lastly, the HR was given more responsibilities related to the EU's external actions, including extensive agenda-setting powers within this policy field. To sum up, centralized institutional personalization clearly dominated over decentralized one.

Despite the evidence of more personalized politics within the CEU and the EUCO, the analysis presented here does not allow us to conclude that there could be clear losers of the personalization process (as would be assumed by the narrow understating of personalization). The Member States (and the collective actors they are part of) remain, unsurprisingly, the decisive actors as they still hold, or at least share, the key powers related to all spheres of EUCO and CEU activities.

Nevertheless, this analysis's results should not be understood as the ultimate answer to the question of institutional personalization. Despite the conclusion that personalization has indeed taken place in both institutions, much more needs to be done. In particular, we should keep in mind that the CEU and the EUCO are characterized by a rather high level of informality when it comes to operating rules governing their functioning. For that reason, further research on institutional personalization in the EUCO and the CEU should be directed to an analysis of the informal rules and practices affecting the positions of individual politicians.

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Appendix

The Personalization of Politics in the Council of the European Union and the European Council

This Appendix explains how the relevant formal rules governing the functioning of the European Council (EUCO) and the Council of the European Union (CEU) were identified, assigned to individual categories, and analysed. The analysis as provided in the article is based on institutions' Rules of Procedure (RoP) and the provisions of the European Union(EU)/European Communities(EC) primary law. The period followed in the study began in 1993 when (a) the Treaty on European Union and revision of the Treaty Establishing the European Community (hereinafter Maastricht Treaty) entered into force; and (b) the revision of the CEU RoP of 1993 was adopted. The analysis covers the period until 2018 when the CEU amended its RoP. The documents were searched using the Public Register of Council Documents, DORIE Database and EUR-Lex Portal.

The Appendix is composed of two parts: the first one describes a process of analysis in a more detailed way and provides clarifications and also some examples of how individual provisions were/were not coded. The second section provides the overviews of assignments of personalizing and depersonalizing reforms identified in the individual categories under the study (see also Table 1 of the article), and more detailed quantitative overviews (Tables 3 and 5).

Part one: A description of the coding process and illustrations of coding

The analysis can be seen as a four-step process (1) beginning with identifying relevant provisions; (2) continuing with their assignment to the individual spheres of EUCO and CEU activities and excluding the irrelevant provisions; (3) evaluating whether there was a change affecting the position and the powers of followed individual and collective actors; and finally (4) deciding on which actor benefited from the formal institutional reform in question. In other words, in the last step, it was evaluated whether a particular change in rule or mechanism was favourable to the actors at the top (centralized institutional

personalization), other individual actors (decentralized institutional personalization) or collective actors (institutional depersonalization of politics).

1. At the beginning of the process, all articles containing information about powers and responsibilities of the followed actors with respect to the individual categories were identified. All other provisions were excluded from the analysis. In the case of EU/EC primary law, I narrowed the focus to institutional provisions. Hence, policy-related provisions were not analysed (with the exception of HR position and powers). In this step, I considered relevant the provisions that related to the analysed spheres of activities (see Table 1 of the article), containing information about the powers and responsibilities of followed individual and collective actors (see Figure 1 of the article).
2. In the second step, the provisions were assigned to the individual categories. Since a unit of analysis was a particular power/responsibility of an actor and not a particular Rule per se, it happened that the Rule in question appeared in more than one category on occasion. For an illustration of such an assignment, see Box 1 below.

Rules 20(1) and 20(1b) of the RoP of June 2000:

1. The Presidency shall be responsible for the application of these Rules of Procedure and for ensuring that discussions are conducted in a businesslike manner. It may, unless a decision is taken to the contrary, take any appropriate measure and in particular:

(a) ...

(b) set the order in which items are to be taken and determine the duration of discussions on them;

(c) ...

Box 1: Illustration of the Rule containing responsibilities assigned to more categories¹⁶

Even if a rule as such was assigned to just one category, I distinguished whether it contained one or more power(s). I provide an example of such Rule in Box 2 below accompanied by an explanation of the assignment.

¹⁶ A text written in bold represents amended/newly added part while a strikethrough represents a previous wording or deleted parts.

Rule 8(2) of the RoP of September 2006_ex Rule 8(3) of the RoP of March 2004:

~~2. On a decision taken by the Council or by Coreper, acting by a qualified majority, the Council shall hold at least one public debate on important new legislative proposals other than those referred to in paragraph 1. The Council's first deliberation on important new legislative proposals other than those to be adopted in accordance with the codecision procedure shall be open to the public. **The Presidency shall identify which new legislative proposals are important and the Council or Coreper may decide otherwise, whenever appropriate. The Presidency may decide, on a case by case basis, that the subsequent Council deliberations on a particular legislative act shall be open to the public, unless the Council or Coreper decides otherwise.**~~

Box 2: An illustration of the Rule containing more responsibilities assigned to the one category

Once the relevant provisions were assigned to the categories, I proceeded to the second round of identifying both relevant and irrelevant provisions in terms of personalization of politics.

2.1 Since I was interested in the personalization of politics as a process of change in rules, mechanisms, and institutions affecting individual actors' position and powers, I took into account: (a) provisions which were amended by the particular revision, and (b) which altered the position/powers of actors followed. In other words, in order to be a relevant reform, there must have been a change from t_0 to t_1 and/or from t_1 to t_2 and so on. However, it does not mean that I excluded unaltered provisions completely. In the qualitative part of the study, such unaltered provisions allowed me to evaluate whether the changes in the position of individual actors challenged the importance and powers of the collective ones.

2.2 On the other hand, the following provisions were not considered relevant in terms of political personalization: (a) provisions altering the positions/powers of collective actors without affecting the importance of individual politicians (Box 3); and (b) technical amendments and changes in wording (Box 4).

Rule 2(1) of the CEU RoP of December 2009_ex Rule 2(1) of the RoP of September 2006:

1. The Council ~~may~~ **shall** meet in different configurations according to the subject-matter dealt with. ~~The Council in its General Affairs and External Relations configuration (hereinafter referred to as General Affairs and External Relations Council), convened in a meeting as referred to in paragraph 2(a), shall fix the list of these configurations, which is set out in Annex 1.~~ **The list of Council configurations, other than the General Affairs and Foreign Affairs configurations, shall be adopted by the European Council acting by a qualified majority.** The list of Council

Box 3: Illustrations of irrelevant formal provisions: formally institutionalized powers, transfer of powers or their limitations without an effect on the individual politicians' powers

Rule 11(4) of the RoP of June 2000_ex Rule 9(4) of the RoP of May 1999:

4. The presence of a majority of the members of the Council who are, under the Treaties,

Box 4: Illustrations of irrelevant formal provisions: technical change

3. In the third step, I evaluated whether the changes in formal rules affected the position/importance/powers/responsibilities of the followed actors. In doing so, I was not interested exclusively in new provisions and powers assigned to individual actors. I took into account also mechanisms in place at individual levels affecting actors' activities.
4. Lastly, I was interested in whether the amendments in question strengthened the position and the importance of individual 'top' politicians (centralized institutional personalization), other individual politicians (decentralized institutional personalization) or collective actors (depersonalization). In the following two boxes, I provide some examples of institutional personalization and depersonalization of politics in the CEU and the EUCO.

Rule 2(3a) of the CEU RoP of December 2009_ex Rule 2(3a) of the RoP of September 2006:

3. The arrangements for the preparation of European Council meetings are provided for in Article 3 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Council, as follows:

(a) In order to ensure the preparation provided for in Article 2(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the European Council, at least four weeks before each ordinary meeting of the European Council as referred to in Article 1(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the European Council, ~~the General Affairs and External Relations Council~~ **the President of the European Council, in close cooperation with the member of the European Council representing the Member State holding the six-monthly Presidency of the Council and with the President of the Commission,** ~~shall draw up an annotated draft agenda on a proposal by the Presidency~~ submit an annotated draft agenda to the General Affairs Council.

Explanation: Here, the EUCO President replaced the GAER Council in drafting an annotated draft agenda, i.e. it was counted as centralized personalizing reform.

Rule 20(2) of the RoP of July 2002_ex Rule 20(2) of the RoP of June 2000:

2. Without prejudice **to the provisions of Article 19(4) to (6) and** to its powers and its overall political responsibility, the Presidency shall be assisted by the representative of the Member State next holding the Presidency. At the Presidency's request and acting on its instructions, the latter shall replace it as and when required, shall relieve it, where necessary, of certain ~~administrative~~ tasks and shall ensure the continuity of the Council's proceedings.

Explanation: In this case, the actors of decentralized personalization (assuming they will hold the next rotating Presidency) are not limited in their involvement to exclusively administrative tasks (it was coded as decentralized personalizing reform).

Rule 12(2a, b) of the RoP of September 2006_ex Rule 12(4) of the RoP of March 2004:

Box 5: Illustrations of personalizing institutional reforms

Article 214(2) TEEC (Treaty of Nice)_ex 214(2) TEEC (Treaty of Amsterdam):

2. ~~The governments of the Member States~~ **Council, meeting in the composition of Heads of State or Government and acting by a qualified majority** shall nominate ~~by common accord~~, the person it intends to appoint as President of the Commission; the nomination shall be approved by the European Parliament.

Explanation: As mentioned in the article, changes in nomination, election and appointment procedures in which the unanimity was replaced by a QMV were counted as depersonalizing since they reduce the importance of individual members (i.e. they formally lost the veto power).

Annex IV(4) of the RoP of March 2004:

4. Coreper shall avoid going over ground already covered in the preparation of its proceedings. That shall apply in particular to “I” items, to information on the organisation and order of its business and to information on the agenda and organisation of forthcoming Council meetings. Wherever possible, delegations

Box 6: Examples of depersonalizing institutional reforms

Concluding and general remarks:

- 1) For the purpose of a quantitative overview of institutional personalization as presented in the article, I counted and reported each particular reform/rule/provision once, even if it appeared at several places in the RoP, within the RoP of both institutions, or within both RoP and EU/EC primary law (for an overview of such Rules, see Table 4 below). However, as already stated above, if a rule in question introduced more powers from various categories for the actors, it could have been counted and reported more times.
- 2) It often happened that a rule in question was amended in a way that some of the powers and responsibilities were either newly introduced or removed from a particular rule. In such cases, I always checked whether the powers/responsibilities were indeed new (i.e. they did not appear in any form in the previous version of RoP) or whether they were not moved to the other rule.

Part two: An overview of the assignment of identified personalizing and depersonalizing reforms

This part is composed of five tables that contain the assignments of identified personalizing (Table 1) and depersonalizing (Table 2) reforms into individual categories/ spheres of activities under study. Moreover, I provide more details about the number of (de)-personalizing reforms in individual categories (Table 5), distribution of centralized personalizing reforms among three actors (Table 3), and an overview of 'overlapping' Rules (Table 4).

Notes to the reader with respect to the Tables 1 and 2 below:

- 1) The tables contain exclusively provisions/rules which were evaluated as personalizing (Table 1) and depersonalizing (Table 2).
- 2) Rules of Procedure and EU treaties not containing an identified (de)-personalized reform are excluded from the tables – although such documents were analysed, too.
- 3) The tables do not contain the assignments of relevant rules as indicated in the Rules of the Procedure of 1993 and in the Maastricht Treaty as these were considered as reference documents – i.e. they represent a state in t_0 .

Table 2. An overview of the assignment of identified personalizing reforms/articles.

RoP\Category	Mandate		Internal Organization	Agenda-management			Internal decision-making procedures
	Performance of	Nomination/Election/Appointment		Agenda-setting	Agenda-structuring	Agenda-exclusion	
CEU RoP of December 1998 (98/709/EC, ECSC, Euratom)	-	-	-	-	-	-	8(4)_Ex 8(4)
Treaty of Amsterdam	18(3) TEU_ex J.5(3) 24 TEU 2 reforms in 26 TEU_ex J.16 TEU	-	-	2 reforms in 26 TEU_ex J.16 TEU	-	-	-
CEU RoP of June 2000 (2000/396/EC, ECSC, Euratom)	2 reforms in 20(1) 20(1a) 20(2)	-	-	-	2 reforms in 20(1b)	-	-

CEU RoP July 2002 (2002/682/EC, Euratom)	20(1c)_ex 20(1c) 20(1e) 20(2)_ex 20(2) 26(1)_ex 26(1)	-	-	2(3a) 2 reforms: 2(4) and (5)	8(1a) 20(1d)	-	-
Treaty of Nice	27(d)	-	-	-	-	-	-
CEU RoP of March 2004 (2004/338/EC, Euratom)	Annex IV(1) 2(3b)_ex 2(3)	-	-	Annex IV(5) 1(2)_ex 1(2)	-	-	-
CEU RoP of September 2006 (2006/683/EC, Euratom)	-	-	-	-	2 reforms in 8(2)_ex Art 8(3)	-	2 reforms: 12(2a) and (2b)

<p>Treaty of Lisbon</p>	<p>26(1) TEU_ex 13(1) TEU; see also EUCO RoP 2009, 1(1)</p> <p>15(2) TEU_ex 4 TEU; see also EUCO RoP 2009, 4(4)</p> <p>16(9) TEU_ex 203 TEEC</p> <p>18(3) TEU_ex 26 TEU</p> <p>15(3) TEU; see also EUCO RoP 2009, 1(2)</p> <p>16(6) TEU; see also CEU RoP 2006, 2(2a); and EUCO RoP 2009, 2(2)</p> <p>15(3) TEU_ex 4 TEU; see also EUCO RoP 2009, 4(4) (centralized)</p>	<p>15(5) TEU</p> <p>33 TEU_ex 18(5) TEU</p>	<p>-</p>	<p>-</p>	<p>-</p>	<p>-</p>	<p>-</p>
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	<p>15(3) TEU_ex 4 TEU; see also EUCO RoP 2009, 4(4) (decentralized)</p> <p>26(2) TEU_ex 13(3) TEU</p> <p>26(3) TEU</p> <p>18(2) TEU_ex 26(2) TEU</p> <p>2 reforms in 27(2) TEU_ex 26 TEU</p> <p>27(3)</p> <p>33 TEU</p> <p>3 reforms in 36 TEU_ex 21 TEU</p> <p>38 TEU_ex 25 TEU; see also CEU RoP 2009, 19(4)</p>						
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<p>CEU RoP of December 2009 (2009/937/EU)</p>	<p>1(4) and 20(2)_ex 20(2)</p> <p>2(2)_Ex 2(2)</p> <p>2(5); see also 1(4)</p> <p>19(4)_ex 19(4); see also Treaty Of Lisbon, 38 TEU</p>	<p>-</p>	<p>-</p>	<p>2(6)_ex 2(4)</p>	<p>-</p>	<p>-</p>	<p>-</p>
<p>EUCO RoP of December 2009 (2009/882/EU)</p>	<p>1(1); see also Treaty of Lisbon, 26(1)</p> <p>1(2)_see also Treaty of Lisbon, 15(3) TEU</p> <p>4(4); see also Treaty of Lisbon, 15(2)</p> <p>2(2)_ex CEU RoP 2006, 2(2a) and (3); see also CEU RoP 2009, 2(2); and</p>	<p>-</p>	<p>-</p>	<p>2 reforms in 3(1)_ex CEU RoP 2006, 2(3a)</p> <p>2(6)</p> <p>7; see also CEU RoP 2006, 12(1); and CEU RoP 2009, 12(1)</p>	<p>2 reforms in 3(1) 3(1) and (2)</p>	<p>-</p>	<p>-</p>

	<p>Treaty of Lisbon, 16(6) TEU</p> <p>2(1)_ex CEU RoP 2006, 2(2a)</p> <p>2(3)</p> <p>2(1); see also CEU RoP 2009, 2(4); and Treaty of Lisbon, 15(6c) TEU</p> <p>4(1), first sentence</p> <p>4(4); see also Treaty of Lisbon, 15(3) (centralized)</p> <p>4(4); see also Treaty of Lisbon, 15(3) (decentralized)</p> <p>2 reforms in 4(1), second sentence</p>						
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Note: the treaties are ordered among Rules of Procedure based on a date when they entered into force.

Table 2. An overview of the assignment of identified depersonalizing reforms/articles.

RoP\Category	Mandate		Internal Organization	Agenda management			Internal decision-making procedures
	Performance of	Nomination/ Election/ Appointment		Agenda-setting	Agenda-structuring	Agenda-exclusion	
Treaty of Amsterdam	-	2 reforms in 214(2) TEEC_ex 158(2) TEEC	-	-	-	-	-
CEU RoP of June 2000 (2000/396/EC, ECSC, Euratom)	-	-	-	-	-	2 reforms in 3(6)_ex 2(6) 21_ex 18	-
Treaty of Nice	-	207(2) TEEC_ex Art 207(2) TEEC; see also CEU RoP 2004, 23(1) 3 reforms in 214(2) TEEC_ex 214(2) TEEC 247(3)_ex 247(3) TEEC	-	-	-	-	-

		259(1)_ex Art 258(2)					
		263_ex Art 263(3)					
CEU RoP of March 2004 (2004/338/EC, Euratom)	Annex IV(10)	23(1)_ex 23(1); see also Treaty of Nice, 207(2)	-	3 reforms: Annex IV(4),(6) and (7)	-	-	-
Treaty of Lisbon	-	283(2) TFEU_ex 112(2b) TEEC 18(1) TEU_ex 207(2) TEEC 15(5) TEU	-	-	-	-	-
EUCO RoP of December 2009 (2009/882/EU)	4(4); see also 15(3) TEU_ex 4(2) TEU	-	-	-	-	-	-

Table 3. Distribution of centralized personalizing reforms among the actors of centralized personalization

Actor of centralized personalization/Category	Mandate		Agenda-management			Internal decision-making procedures	Overall
	Performance of	Nom/Ele/App	Agenda-setting	Agenda-structuring	Agenda-exclusion		
EUCO President	11	1	4	3	0	0	19
CEU rotating Presidency	11	0	4	6	0	3	24
High Representative CFSP	19	1	3	0	0	0	23
Overall for categories	41	2	11	9	0	3	66

Note: Some reforms could be favourable to more actors of centralized personalization, i.e. they could enhance position of, for example, EUCO President and at the same time rotating CEU Presidency.

Table 4. An overview of reforms that appeared in Table 1 and Table 2 above twice (i.e. in primary law as well as in the RoP), but were counted as one reform.

Type of reform	Category	Reform identified in	
Personalizing: centralized	Mandate (Performance of)	Treaty of Lisbon, 15(2) TEU	EUCO RoP (2009), 4(4)
Personalizing: centralized	Mandate (Performance of)	Treaty of Lisbon, 15(3) TEU	EUCO RoP (2009), 1(2)
Personalizing: centralized	Mandate (Performance of)	16(6) TEU	EUCO RoP (2009), 2(2); and CEU RoP (2009), 2(2)
Personalizing: centralized	Mandate (Performance of)	Treaty of Lisbon, 15(3) TEU	EUCO RoP (2009), 4(4)
Personalizing: decentralized	Mandate (Performance of)	Treaty of Lisbon, 15(3)	EUCO RoP (2009), 4(4)
Personalizing: centralized	Mandate (Performance of)	Treaty of Lisbon, 26(1) TEU	EUCO RoP (2009), 1(1)
Personalizing: centralized	Mandate (Performance of)	Treaty of Lisbon, 38 TEU	CEU RoP (2009), 19(4)
Depersonalizing	Mandate (Nomination/Election/ Appointment)	Treaty of Nice, 207(2) TEEC	CEU RoP (2004), 23(1)

Table 5. A quantitative overview of reforms affecting the positions of individual actors (i.e. centralizing and decentralizing)

Category/personalization		Centralized personalization	Decentralized personalization	Depersonalization	Overall number of personalizing reforms	Overall number of reforms affecting position of individuals
Mandate	Performance of	38	5	2	43	45
	Nomination/Election/Appointment	2	0	12	2	14
Internal Organization		0	0	0	0	0
Agenda-management	Setting	9	3	3	12	15
	Structuring	9	0	0	9	9
	Exclusion	0	0	3	0	3
Internal procedures	decision-making	3	0	0	3	3
Overall		61	8	20	69	89